Als we willen dat het stopt, dan stopt het. Je moet het hard genoeg willen, met elkaar, zij aan zij, en voor niets wijken.

Geef het moorddadige ISIS haattuig geen seconde de kans te hopen dat wij een stap terug doen, maar ontneem ze die hoop.

Onthoud dat ze niets zijn behalve hun haat, dat ze geen eigenwaarde hebben. Alleen hun haat. En die bezit hen. Maar hun haat tegen alles dat anders is, is eigenlijk de haat tegen zichzelf.

Dat ze nooit, gewoon, met vriendjes kind zijn geweest. Dat ze de taal die ook van hen een succes had kunnen maken, niet goed spreken waardoor ze op school achter bleven en ze allemaal wegstroomden naar het praktijkonderwijs - ondanks dat een normale vertegenwoordiging het IQ moet hebben voor hoger onderwijs. Ze haten zichzelf, ze haten de achterlijke sociale omstandigheden waar ze uit komen.

Ze schamen zich voor hun ouders en daarover haten ze zichzelf weer.

Hun enige uitweg uit deze put van minderwaardigheid is de verheerlijking van een imaginair verleden en de volledige onderwerping aan een repressieve orthodoxie.

Het geluk dat zij daarin vinden is de sexuele bevrediging van de vernedering. Ze roepen de suprematie van de Islam uit om eindelijk bij iets groots te horen.

Maar hoe harder ze schreeuwen, hoe harder de echo verraad dat het gebouw van hun gedachten leeg is. Hun enige hoop op de toekomst komt voort uit hun gedrag van vernietiging dat zo kenmerkend is voor mensen zonder eigenwaarde.

Hun enige beeld van de toekomst is er een van dood en verderf. De leugen van de jihad drijft hen voort. Het is de overwinning van de haat, van de God van het gehenna. De haat die als voortrazend vuur alles op zijn pad verteert.

Maar aan het eind verteert het ook zichzelf. Heel het Midden-Oosten valt er aan ten prooi.

En er is maar een weg uit dit dal: laat ze hun haat, laat ze aan hun eigen haat ten onder gaan.'

Editor's note: Aaron David Miller is a vice president and distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and was a Middle East negotiator in Democratic and Republican administrations. Follow him on Twitter. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

(CNN) -- By now it should be painfully obvious that this latest round of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis in Gaza is fundamentally different than its predecessors.

Unlike the two previous rounds in 2008-09 and in 2012, which ended after three weeks and one week, respectively, this round, now in its fourth week, is infinitely more complex. The rapid failure of the cease-fire put in place by Thursday's agreement only emphasizes that fact. Getting to de-escalation, let alone a durable endgame, will be hard. And here are the five reasons why:

1. Hamas, the political/military paradox: One of the reasons the conflict has dragged on for so long is Hamas' anomalous situation. It entered the crisis -- indeed may have helped to trigger it -- because it was weak, financially bankrupt and politically isolated, and thought it could get Israel and the world's attention through violence. This political weakness has now raised the stakes.

Hamas can't stand down without major deliverables that will justify to its supporters and residents of Gaza the death and destruction its rockets have courted. And right now as attacks against Israeli forces attest, the military wing is dominant. Indeed, militarily it has the power to continue the fight. So there's no real urgency to back off without big gains.

Political desperation, combined with military resilience, ensures the conflict will go on. Indeed, Hamas' goal is probably to launch more rockets against Israel the day before the cease-fire is concluded than on the first day the conflict began.

Hamas can't stand down without major deliverables that will justify to its supporters and residents of Gaza the death and destruction its rockets have courted. And right now as attacks against Israeli forces attest, the military wing is dominant. Indeed, militarily it has the power to continue the fight. So there's no real urgency to back off without big gains.

Political desperation, combined with military resilience, ensures the conflict will go on. Indeed, Hamas' goal is probably to launch more rockets against Israel the day before the cease-fire is concluded than on the first day the conflict began.

2. Iron Dome buys space and time: Perhaps the most stunning success of this crisis on the Israeli side has been the Iron Dome missile defense system's capacity to neutralize the threat of Hamas' high trajectory weapons. With only three civilian casualties, economic damage that is relatively limited and not that dramatic a change in the routine of most Israelis (at least those who don't live close to Gaza) the anti-missile defense system has reshaped the basic contours of the conflict.

On one hand, Iron Dome has pre-empted or at least delayed the need for a large-scale ground incursion into Gaza. But on the other it has given Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the political elites and the public the latitude to continue to achieve Israel's objectives.

In short, for Israel, too, there's no real urgency to stand down. With the home front secure, the government needs to worry about two things: Israel Defense Forces casualties (so far apparently tolerable at more than 60 even though that's four times the number in both previous confrontations) and international pressure as a result of the horrific Palestinian civilian death toll in Gaza. And both of these could become magnified in the event Israel decides to launch a massive ground incursion into Gaza.

3. No good mediator: In 2008-09, Israel withdrew its forces and unilaterally declared a cease-fire that held more or less; in 2012, the Egyptians brokered one pretty quickly to end that round. This time around you have plenty of would-be mediators, including the United States, the United Nations and Egypt, all of which were involved in the Thursday agreement. But that agreement reflects the reality that none of these mediators had much influence with Hamas' military wing.

Moreover, all of them misjudged the degree to which Hamas on the ground in Gaza was prepared to end the fight.

There is not a single mediator among them that's trusted by both sides. Egypt -- no longer run by the pro-Hamas Mohamed Morsy -- is bent on squeezing the Islamists and is working closely with Israel. And the United States has no ties or influence with Hamas. And we don't even have a situation where one mediator can work on Israel and party X could mediate with Hamas in a kind of diplomatic tag team. Indeed, the flaws of trying to negotiate a cease-fire by committee were all too apparent in the collapse of the Thursday accord.

4. Expectations, the real problem: Unlike the two previous confrontations or even the second intifada where Israel and Hamas squared off, this crisis is driven by expectations on each side that will be hard, if not impossible, to meet.

Even if the two sides wanted to stand down, they have raised the hopes among their respective publics that can only constrain each of them and prove disappointing to Israelis and Palestinians as well.

Netanyahu wants to avoid a massive ground incursion, yet he's identified an endgame -- demilitarization of Hamas -- that would require the forceful disarming of an organization that isn't going to agree to give up its weapons voluntarily. And the Israeli public, which has backed the current strategy of trying to pummel Hamas into submission, expects an outcome that is more decisive than in previous rounds.

Hamas, on the other hand, seems -- in a cosmic roll of the dice -- to be holding out at all costs and somehow banking that if it does so, Israel will be forced to agree to open up Gaza (or will do so willingly), release Hamas prisoners and expand fishing rights and that Egypt will agree to open up the Rafah crossing.

The more death and destruction in Gaza, the more Hamas needs an explanation at the end of the day to justify the sacrifices and the pain of Gaza's 1.8 million residents. And it's not even clear what the objectives of Hamas' military wing really are. The real tragedy is that the odds against any lasting trade-off of demilitarization for economic freedom seem long indeed without some dramatic change in either Israel's or Hamas' calculations or Hamas' total collapse and defeat.

5. Not enough urgency: It's an inconvenient fact, but the reality is that right now, there doesn't seem to be enough urgency, let alone an imperative for Israel or Hamas to back down. Gaza's public doesn't have much say in the matter when it comes to the Hamas military wing's strategy, and the Israeli public, according to opinion polls, seems enthusiastic about keeping up the pressure. Israel's calculations seem to be to neutralize the tunnel threat and pummel Gaza with air and artillery until Hamas agrees to a cease-fire on Israel's terms.

Hamas wants to survive with its military and political leadership intact, and it hopes that massive Palestinian casualties will galvanize the international community to press Israel to stop and that more IDF deaths will cause Israel to sour on the operation.

So where is this headed? In both previous confrontations, we might have confidently predicted some diplomatic endgame. Not now. For the moment, the focus has shifted from a brief foray into diplomacy back to escalating conflict. The prospects of some kind of an expanded Israeli operation into Gaza are highly likely, with all the casualties that could entail.

What separates this round of the Israel-Hamas battle from the others is that there's no predictable path away from much more bloodshed. And that -- given the tragic loss of life -- is the terrifying truth.

Note: This article was updated to delete references to the capture of an IDF soldier; Israeli authorities now say the soldier was among those killed by a suicide bomber.

Jerusalem (CNN) -- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been crystal clear about the goals of Operation Protective Edge. Destroy Hamas' tunnels, end its rocket-fire (and that of Islamic Jihad), and bring about "sustainable quiet" for the people of Israel by demilitarizing Gaza.

Those aims were restated by Netanyahu's spokesman, Mark Regev, as the latest ceasefire came into force Tuesday. "We don't want to see that terrorist military machine rebuilt," he told CNN. "We have to make sure that Gaza stays demilitarized."

After nearly a month of combat, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) say they have destroyed 32 "offensive" tunnels.

Hamas' stocks of rockets have been depleted (by about two-thirds), its launch facilities hit hard, the IDF says. But how do you define "demilitarized?" Hamas' short-range mortars killed more Israelis than its rockets -- does Israel insist on those being surrendered? How would they even be found? And by whom?

Sustainable quiet will depend on factors Israel can influence, but not control: Above all its willingness to offer the 1.8 million people of Gaza a future that is something better than an open prison. It's estimated around two-thirds of Gazans have never left the Strip; Palestinian writer Amir Nizar Zuabi speaks of a desperate fatalism after nearly a decade of conflict.

"We, who were attacked from the sky, from the sea, from the fields, who had one-ton bombs dropped on our heads in pointless rounds of killing, have turned our back on life," he wrote in Haaretz this week.

Can they turn again -- and glimpse a future in which they can sell their produce in foreign markets and travel freely, in which they can find work, build homes and see their children receive an education without the overhanging fear of the next bombardment?

Such a possibility was envisaged in the agreement that ended the last conflict in 2012 and provided for "opening the crossings and facilitating the movements of people and transfer of goods, and refraining from restricting residents' free movements and targeting residents in border areas."

But the agreement was not implemented.

"Israel had committed to holding indirect negotiations with Hamas over the implementation of the ceasefire but repeatedly delayed them," partly because of domestic political considerations, writes Nathan Thrall, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, in the London Review of Books.

Israeli officials and analysts have cited elections and coalition-building as delaying any meaningful engagement, even though 2013 saw fewer rocket attacks than any year since 2006.

Will it be different this time?

The destruction of entire Gaza neighborhoods (Zeitoun, Beit Hanoun, Khuzaa to name but three) and the displacement of more than 500,000 people according to U.N. estimates Tuesday -- will demand a huge reconstruction program.

Netanyahu says Israel is "demanding that the rehabilitation of Gaza be linked to its demilitarization." On the contrary, says Maen Areikat, the PLO's envoy in the U.S.: "What they should offer is an end to the blockade, an end to the occupation, before they can even ask the Palestinians to consider the idea of being demilitarized."

Retired Brigadier-General Yossi Kuperwasser, Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Strategic Affairs, says this linkage or sequencing is the $64,000 question. "The old ideas didn't work," he said. "We need new ones. We have to make sure the international community takes steps so that cement coming into Gaza is used for civilian projects."

Kuperwasser said a "totally different structure of supervision should be in place" before Israel can allow what might be called dual-use materials into Gaza.

That structure would include, according to Israeli officials, a Palestinian Authority police force at the Rafah crossing into Egypt. The European Union has offered to reactivate its Border Assistance Mission, which operated at the Rafah crossing between 2005 and 2007, as a second layer of supervision at all crossings.

Hamas: a change of heart, or tactics?

Will Hamas, chastened by a devastating onslaught that has left hundreds of its fighters dead or captured, and which has seen the tunnels in which it invested so heavily blown up and bulldozed, simply start over -- preparing for the next round? Or will it see a new reality amid the dust and rubble?

Few observers expect Hamas to give up the language of defiance. It can derive some satisfaction from the level of resistance its fighters offered, especially in close-quarters fighting in places like Shujayya. The predictions of some Israeli officials that Hamas fighters would melt away once the going got tough were confounded.

Veteran defense writer Amos Harel says in Haaretz: "Hamas was not defeated; the organization will remain in power in Gaza and [will be] the key partner in any future agreement."

But the movement is beleaguered. Its leadership has gone underground, literally and metaphorically, to avoid assassination by IDF air-strikes. It faces a severe financial crisis, unable to pay the salaries of government employees.

It's been abandoned by former patrons Iran and Syria, and is caught in the growing Shia-Sunni divide across the Arab world. Its chief financier, Qatar, which has stepped in to pay $20 million a month in wages to Gazan workers, is under pressure from other Gulf states to scale back support for Hamas.

Above all President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt has strangled Hamas economically and militarily. Soon after the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsy a year ago, el-Sisi -- then military chief -- moved to close the smuggling tunnels under the Egyptian-Gaza border, depriving Hamas of much-needed revenue and its only way to import weapons.

Hamas may also face growing dissent within Gaza, or at least less support, as people weigh up the cost, in human and financial terms, of the latest conflict. In Shujayya Tuesday, Hany Mahmoud el Harezen surveyed the ruins of his house.

"I am a wedding photographer. I have nothing to do with this war," he told CNN. "Maybe if we had got some concessions it would be worth it, but we got nothing."

It appears to be a growing sentiment, and one that Kuperwasser thinks will help change Hamas' calculations. "It has made a strategic decision," he says, "to give up part of its terrorist identity in order to keep control over Gaza."

Netanyahu's options

For now, Netanyahu can negotiate from a position of strength. He, his Defense Minister and the Israeli Chief of Staff have enjoyed better than 80% approval ratings for much of the campaign, despite the deaths of more than 60 Israeli soldiers -- a far higher toll than during the fully-fledged invasion of Gaza in 2008-09.

"There is trust from the Israeli public that this triumvirate know exactly what they are doing," said Marcus Sheff of the Israel Project. "They feel they have a leadership that is controlled and moderate in defending them and doing what needs to be done on the military and political level."

Even the opposition Labor Party has praised the conduct of the campaign. "They operate very carefully, proportionately. I think they defend Israel through their decisions," Labor Knesset member Nachman Shai told CNN.

If anything, it is the right-wing that challenges Netanyahu -- with some in the coalition government saying the campaign in Gaza has not gone far enough and that Hamas should be crushed. Netanyahu has warned cabinet ministers pushing for a more aggressive approach to fall into line. He appears to accept that Hamas cannot be eradicated, certainly not without a full occupation of Gaza that would be a quagmire and entail international condemnation.

Some Israeli officials believe Hamas actually serves a purpose -- preventing fundamentalist groups like Islamic Jihad from taking over Gaza. They are also happy to see the Palestinians in two camps: Hamas and the Palestinian Authority rather than united under one flag.

An end to the two-state solution?

Netanyahu is now the second-longest serving Prime Minister in Israel's history, To some observers his longevity is down to his innate caution, his refusal to make compromises that might down the road put Israel's security at risk.

As the latest conflict in Gaza erupted, he said that had Israel given up security control of the West Bank, it would be inviting disaster. "If we were to pull out of Judea and Samaria, like they tell us to, there'd be a possibility of thousands of tunnels"

Expanding on the theme, Netanyahu added: "There cannot be a situation under any agreement in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the River Jordan."

To many observers in Israel that was shorthand for "there will be no Palestinian state."

The prospect of a wider peace deal seems as far away as ever, even if its essential components are the same as they were 20 years ago -- a two-state solution, co-existence between Israel and the West Bank with mutually agreed territorial swaps, and the removal of most Jewish settlements from the West Bank.

Senior Israeli officials look at the turmoil around them, from Iraq and Syria to Libya, and ask whether settling the Palestinian issue is still the most pressing of the day. Arab governments are preoccupied with survival, not Palestinian liberation. Kuperwasser at Israel's Ministry of Strategic Affairs says the real threat to the region is Islamist radicalism; and that has brought together Israel and moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan (and by extension Saudi Arabia.)

To many observers, an agreement between Fatah and Hamas signed on April 23 this year provides the best -- perhaps the only -- hope of breaking the cycle of violence. In it, Hamas agreed to a "consensus government" of Palestinians that pledged non-violence, the recognition of Israel, and adherence to past agreements, a government that would restore the influence of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.

"Tragically, Israel rejected this opportunity for peace and has succeeded in preventing the new government's deployment in Gaza," say former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Mary Robinson, a former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, in "Foreign Policy."

If this government is now allowed to take root in Gaza, to take responsibility for its reconstruction and allow for an internationally-agreed and verifiable program of demilitarization, perhaps the future can be different.

But as Nathan Thrall of the International Crisis Group concludes:"This solution would of course have been available to Israel, the U.S., Egypt and the Palestinian Authority in the weeks and months before the war began, before so many lives were shattered."

De mars van de vrijheid heeft toelating! Vanaf 15.00 wordt er verzameld op het plein voor Centraal Station. Om 15.30 stipt vertrekken we om dwars door de wijken Schilderswijk en Transvaal om te laten zien dat, ondanks de claim van de salafisten, dit nog steeds Nederlands grondgebied is.

Om te laten zien dat veel Nederlanders het niet meer pikken dat de salafistische ISIS aanhang kunnen doen en laten wat ze willen. Wij willen dat de politie en gemeente korte metten maken met de honderden fundamentalistische islamieten die de Schilderswijk onveilig maken!

Dit kan alleen als elke klager de straat opkomt. Op dit moment hebben we ruim 400 mensen die zich hebben aangemeld.

Deel dit bericht in Facebook groepen en op jouw eigen pagina!

Die dag geen verdeeldheid onderling, links/rechts, Hagenees of Hgenaar, maar samen 1 signaal geven aan de politici op het pluche: Genoeg is genoeg!

Let wel, dit is geen anti islam mars. Dit is een mars tegen de fundamentalisten die hun wetten aan ons willen opdringen. Wij willen de vrijheid behouden om te leven zoals wij zelf willen.

Iedereen is welkom die zich aan de spelregels houd en die de doelstellingen onderschrijft.

https://nl-nl.facebook.com/ProPatriaNederland

De Amerikaanse luchtmacht heeft een stelling van ISIS-troepen in het noorden van Irak gebombardeerd. Gisteren gaf president Obama toestemming voor dergelijke acties ter verdediging van Amerikaanse militairen en christenen die op de vlucht zijn voor de opmars van ISIS-troepen.

Volgens het Pentagon was het bombardement in Erbil een reactie op een ISIS-beschieting van Koerdische troepen die waren gelegerd in de buurt van Amerikaanse manschappen. Twee Amerikaanse gevechtsvliegtuigen wierpen 500-ponders af op een lanceerinstallatie van ISIS.

Een Koerdisch persbureau zegt dat er bij de aanval honderden strijders van ISIS zijn omgekomen en gewond geraakt, maar die aantallen zijn niet van onafhankelijke kant bevestigd.

Washington laat verder met nadruk weten dat de Amerikanen niet van plan zijn om weer grondtroepen naar Irak te sturen. "Ik zal er als bevelhebber voor zorgen dat de VS niet weer in een oorlog in Irak terechtkomt", zei Obama.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUXmqpRhTjQ

Als we willen dat het stopt, dan stopt het. Je moet het hard genoeg willen, met elkaar, zij aan zij, en voor niets wijken.

Geef het moorddadige ISIS haattuig geen seconde de kans te hopen dat wij een stap terug doen, maar ontneem ze die hoop.

Onthoud dat ze niets zijn behalve hun haat, dat ze geen eigenwaarde hebben. Alleen hun haat. En die bezit hen. Maar hun haat tegen alles dat anders is, is eigenlijk de haat tegen zichzelf.

Dat ze nooit, gewoon, met vriendjes kind zijn geweest. Dat ze de taal die ook van hen een succes had kunnen maken, niet goed spreken waardoor ze op school achter bleven en ze allemaal wegstroomden naar het praktijkonderwijs - ondanks dat een normale vertegenwoordiging het IQ moet hebben voor hoger onderwijs. Ze haten zichzelf, ze haten de achterlijke sociale omstandigheden waar ze uit komen.

Ze schamen zich voor hun ouders en daarover haten ze zichzelf weer.

Hun enige uitweg uit deze put van minderwaardigheid is de verheerlijking van een imaginair verleden en de volledige onderwerping aan een repressieve orthodoxie.

Het geluk dat zij daarin vinden is de sexuele bevrediging van de vernedering. Ze roepen de suprematie van de Islam uit om eindelijk bij iets groots te horen.

Maar hoe harder ze schreeuwen, hoe harder de echo verraad dat het gebouw van hun gedachten leeg is. Hun enige hoop op de toekomst komt voort uit hun gedrag van vernietiging dat zo kenmerkend is voor mensen zonder eigenwaarde.

Hun enige beeld van de toekomst is er een van dood en verderf. De leugen van de jihad drijft hen voort. Het is de overwinning van de haat, van de God van het gehenna. De haat die als voortrazend vuur alles op zijn pad verteert.

Maar aan het eind verteert het ook zichzelf. Heel het Midden-Oosten valt er aan ten prooi.

En er is maar een weg uit dit dal: laat ze hun haat, laat ze aan hun eigen haat ten onder gaan.'